The information that Sorge was receiving was extremely valuable to the Soviet intelligence officials to whom he reported. His information stream improved significantly in 1932 when Teikichi Kawai returned from China to Tokyo. Kawai began passing information he obtained from the Japanese Army personnel. As Sorge's information cache grew abundantly, he traveled back and forth from Japan and Russia to hand-deliver it, since he did not have anyone to radio the information. Along his trip, he traveled through the United States where he met with Communist Party members and passed along their information.

Upon his visit to Moscow in 1935, Sorge met with General Uritsky, the head of the Fourth Bureau having replaced General Berzin when Josef Stalin came into power. Sorge showed detailed personnel charts of the Japanese military officers and their attitudes towards the Soviet Union, United States and Britain. Ozaki was officially brought back into the fold of his spy ring as was his former radio operator Max Klausen in November 1935. Sorge and Klausen met weekly for an information exchange while Klausen worked under the cover of a successful blueprints printer.

The Sorge spy ring came under the attention of Japanese intelligence and in January 1936 the Japanese secret police arrested Kawai, charging him with being a spy. Kawai, although interrogated and tortured over a period of six months in Manchuria, refused to provide any information and was subsequently released.

A military incident in February 1936 compelled the German Embassy to call Sorge in and give them an assessment of the political and military climate in Japan. So impressed were the Embassy officials that they considered Sorge a trusted ally and provided him with significant information about the Japanese government. Sorge quickly passed this information along to Moscow, including plans for a intended alliance between Germany and Japan. As his apparent value to the German government appeared to grow, so did his real value to the Soviet Union.

Sorge reported Japanese intentions to attack the United States and emphasized that Japan had no immediate intentions of engaging the Soviet Union in warfare.